The war on marijuana: The transformation of the war on drugs in the 1990s by King, Ryan S & Mauer, Marc
BioMed  Central
Page 1 of 17
(page number not for citation purposes)
Harm Reduction Journal
Open Access Research
The war on marijuana: The transformation of the war on drugs in 
the 1990s
Ryan S King* and Marc Mauer
Address: The Sentencing Project, 514 10th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20004, USA.
Email: Ryan S King* - rking@sentencingproject.org; Marc Mauer - mauer@sentencingproject.org
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
Background:As the "war on drugs" enters the latter half of its third decade since being forged
into the American lexicon by President Ronald Reagan, the public has grown more skeptical of the
current strategy and has proven to be receptive to a broader consideration of alternatives to
incarceration. This has been the case most notably with marijuana offenses, where the policy
discussion has shifted in some localities to one of decriminalization or de-prioritizing law
enforcement resources dedicated to pursuing possession offenses. Despite the increased profile
surrounding marijuana policy in recent years, there remains a significant degree of
misunderstanding regarding the current strategy, both in terms of how resources are being
allocated and to what eventual gain.
Methods:Previous studies have analyzed drug offenses as a general category, but there has yet to
be a single study that has focused specifically on marijuana offenders at all stages of the system. This
report analyzes multiple sources of data for the period 1990–2002 from each of the critical points
in the criminal justice system, from arrest through court processing and into the correctional
system, to create an overall portrait of this country's strategy in dealing with marijuana use.
Results:The study found that since 1990, the primary focus of the war on drugs has shifted to low-
level marijuana offenses. During the study period, 82% of the increase in drug arrests nationally
(450,000) was for marijuana offenses, and virtually all of that increase was in possession offenses.
Of the nearly 700,000 arrests in 2002, 88% were for possession. Only 1 in 18 of these arrests
results in a felony conviction, with the rest either being dismissed or adjudicated as a misdemeanor,
meaning that a substantial amount of resources, roughly $4 billion per year for marijuana alone, is
being dedicated to minor offenses.
Conclusion:The results of this study suggest that law enforcement resources are not being
effectively allocated to offenses which are most costly to society. The financial and personnel
investment in marijuana offenses, at all points in the criminal justice system, diverts funds away from
other crime types, thereby representing a questionable policy choice.
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The War on Marijuana: The Transformation of the War
on Drugs in the 1990s
Federal law enforcement is targeted effectively at convicting
major drug traffickers and punishing them with longer lockups
in prison. [1]
-John Ashcroft, Former United States Attorney General
Background
Despite decades of discussion and intense media cover-
age, there remains considerable confusion regarding how
the criminal justice system treats marijuana offenders.
This misunderstanding has catalyzed a contentious debate
that has been characterized by disagreements about the
appropriate legal status of marijuana, the suitable level of
punishment, and the most effective distribution of insti-
tutional resources to address marijuana use. This has been
coupled with a fundamental difference of opinion about
the true dangers that marijuana use poses to American
society. In light of international developments in which a
number of countries have reduced punishment for mari-
juana use, as well as the growth in the domestic decrimi-
nalization movement culminating in local ballot
initiatives and proposals to amend state law, the struggle
over the appropriate criminal justice response to mari-
juana has become a key policy concern.
Drug war advocates such as John Walters and former
Attorney General John Ashcroft have frequently remarked
that the current criminal justice approach to drug abuse
represents an efficient use of resources. Walters, the head
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, has
lamented that persons who claim that prisons are full of
low-level drug offenders are incorrect and have misin-
formed the debate on drug policy [2].
In order to provide a framework for assessing the role of
marijuana enforcement in the criminal justice system, we
have conducted a national analysis of marijuana offend-
ers for the period of 1990 to 2002. This includes an assess-
ment of trends in arrest, sentencing, and incarceration,
along with an evaluation of the impact of these develop-
ments on marijuana price and availability, and the use of
crime control resources. Our analysis indicates that the
"war on drugs" in the 1990s was, essentially, a "war on
marijuana."
Key findings include:
▪ Of the 450,000 increase in drug arrests during the period
1990–2002, 82% of the growth was for marijuana, and
79% was for marijuana possession alone;
▪ Marijuana arrests now constitute nearly half (45%) of
the 1.5 million drug arrests annually;
▪ Few marijuana arrests are for serious offending: of the
734,000 marijuana arrests in 2000, only 41,000 (6%)
resulted in a felony conviction;
Marijuana as a Proportion of Growth in Drug Arrests – 1990  to 2002 Figure 2
Marijuana as a Proportion of Growth in Drug Arrests – 1990 
to 2002.
Drug Arrest Trends – 1990 to 2002 Figure 1
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▪ Marijuana arrests increased by 113% between 1990 and
2002, while overall arrests decreased by 3%;
▪ New York City experienced an 882% growth in mari-
juana arrests, including an increase of 2,461% for posses-
sion offenses;
▪ African Americans are disproportionately affected by
marijuana arrests, representing 14% of marijuana users in
the general population, but 30% of arrests;
▪ One-third of persons convicted for a marijuana felony in
state court are sentenced to prison;
▪ One in four persons in prison for a marijuana offense –
an estimated 6,600 persons – can be classified as a low-
level offender;
▪ An estimated $4 billion is spent annually on the arrest,
prosecution and incarceration of marijuana offenders.
The findings in this report call for a national discussion
regarding the zealous prosecution of marijuana use and
its consequences for allocation of criminal justice
resources and public safety. Law enforcement has focused
disproportionately on low-level possession charges as a
result of the nation's lack of a thoughtful strategy about
how best to address the consequences of marijuana use.
Consequently, police spend a significant amount of time
arresting marijuana users, many of whom do not merit
being charged in court. This diverts efforts away from
more significant criminal activity while having no appre-
ciable impact on marijuana cost, availability, or use. As
state and federal resources become more limited, a
rational consideration of the most efficient way to address
marijuana use is critical; this discussion should take place
outside the realm of political rhetoric. The findings in this
study can inform that conversation with sound, empirical
analysis of more than a decade's worth of data on the
criminal justice system's treatment of marijuana offend-
ers.
Law enforcement and marijuana
As seen in Figure 1, from 1990 to 2002, drug arrests
nationally increased by 41%, from 1,089,500 to
1,538,800. During this time, the total number of mari-
juana arrests more than doubled from 327,000 to
697,000, an increase of 113%. All non-marijuana drug
arrests increased by only 10%. The percentage of arrests
for all offenses comprised of marijuana more than dou-
bled from 2.3% in 1990 to 5.1% in 2002.
This significant expansion of the drug war was fueled
almost entirely by a focus on marijuana. Of the 450,000
increase in arrests for drugs, 82.4% was solely from mari-
juana arrests, and 78.7% from marijuana possession
arrests.
Trends in Drug Enforcement – 1982 to 2002* Figure 4
Trends in Drug Enforcement – 1982 to 2002*. * = 
Chart adapted from data in Pastore, AL and Maguire, K 
(Eds.): Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2001. 
United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, Washington, DC: USGPO, 2002. (Table 4.29). Addi-
tional data obtained from Crime in the United States, 
2001 (Table 4.1) and Crime in the United States, 2002 
(Table 4.1). Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion.
Growth in Arrests – 1990 to 2002 Figure 3
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Since 1990, there have been 6.2 million arrests for mari-
juana possession and an additional 1 million for mari-
juana trafficking. As of 2002, marijuana arrests comprised
45% of all drug arrests, and of these, possession arrests
constituted 88% of all marijuana arrests. While marijuana
trafficking  arrests declined as a proportion of all drug
arrests during this period (from 6.1% in 1990 to 5.4% in
2002), the proportion for marijuana possession increased
by two-thirds (24% in 1990 to 40% in 2002).
As seen in Figure 3, overall arrests declined by 3% from
1990 to 2002, while marijuana arrests rose by 113%. The
incongruent arrest patterns between marijuana and other
criminal offenses require further analysis to understand
the trends at work. Overall Index I crimes, defined as the
most serious and costly to society, dropped by 24% dur-
ing this period, a time when the United States was experi-
encing the lowest crime rates since the 1970s [3].
From a policy perspective, for this growth to be tenable,
one must assume that marijuana use and marijuana mar-
ket trends ran counter to all national crime trends, includ-
ing patterns in overall drug arrests. As this is rather
unlikely, this growth is probably better understood as the
result of selective enforcement decisions. There is no indi-
cation from national drug survey data that a dramatic
decrease in the use of other drugs led to law enforcement
agencies shifting resources to marijuana [4]. Indeed, there
was a slight increase in the use of all illicit drugs by adult
users between 1992 and 2001 (5.9% to 6.6%) [5]. Over
that same period, emergency room admissions for heroin
continued to increase [6]. Thus, there are no explicit indi-
cations of dramatic shifts in drug use that might explain
the law enforcement trend toward marijuana enforcement
in the 1990s.
An examination of historical drug arrest patterns illus-
trates the role of policy decisions in shaping the trends of
the 1990s. As seen in Figure 4, in 1982, marijuana com-
prised 72% of all drug arrests. At that point, the "war on
drugs" began in earnest and there was a shift in the distri-
bution of arrests for drug abuse violations. By 1992, mar-
ijuana arrests made up only 28% of all drug arrests.
During that same period, the proportion of cocaine and
heroin arrests increased from 13% to 55%.
However, over the course of the 1990s a tangible shift
toward arrest patterns of the early 1980s began to
reemerge. Law enforcement agencies arrested fewer peo-
ple for cocaine and heroin offenses and began to arrest
more people for marijuana possession and sale. By 1996,
marijuana had once again surpassed heroin and cocaine
as the primary drug of arrest, a gap which has widened
since then. Early pursuit of the "war on drugs" targeted
heroin and cocaine (drugs deemed to be hard, costly, or
dangerous), but the current manifestation of the drug war,
from the law enforcement perspective, is targeted dispro-
portionately at marijuana use.
Impact on marijuana use
What impact has the practice of increased arrest for mari-
juana offenses had on rates of use, ease of purchase, and
price? Higher trafficking arrests theoretically should
reduce supply and increase marijuana costs, and an
increase in possession arrests should, if general deterrence
theory applies, reduce use through heightened probability
of apprehension. However, since 1992, real price has
fallen by 16% while potency has increased by 53% [7].
From 1990 to 2002, daily use of marijuana by high school
seniors nearly tripled from 2.2% to 6%. Notably, the cur-
rent 6% level is the same as the level in 1975 [8]. One
study suggests that the rapid increase in low-level arrests,
many of which result in dismissals or misdemeanor con-
victions, reinforces a perception that a person can "get
away with it" [9]. Consequently, the frequent use of mar-
ijuana arrests provides little of the deterrent effect neces-
sary to put pressure on the market exchange.
Thus, after 30 years of aggressively pursuing marijuana,
arrests have grown at a rapid rate while use patterns fluc-
tuate, but remain near the same level. In 1990, 84.4% of
high-school seniors responded that it was fairly easy or very
easy to get marijuana. Despite a record number of arrests,
this figure actually increased  slightly over the 12-year
period of the study to 87.2%, near 1975 levels [10].
The continued ease with which users obtain marijuana
calls into question the wisdom of the national investment
of increased law enforcement targeting marijuana users.
Recent research suggests that raising the price of mari-
juana has a significant impact on its use; however, law
enforcement has not succeeded in raising prices [11]. Fig-
ure 5 illustrates the growth of marijuana arrests plotted
alongside the average annual cost for marijuana by the
gram [12]. Marijuana prices are measured at 2000 values
to allow for comparison. In all three categories of mari-
juana distribution, costs have dropped consistently since
1991.
Despite a 113% increase in marijuana arrests, almost
exclusively for possession, marijuana costs have
decreased, and purity increased as have use and perceived
availability. If increased law enforcement and an
expanded use of arrests were successful in restricting the
supply of marijuana, then an increase in its price would be
expected. Instead, marijuana prices fell continuously dur-
ing the 1990s even as marijuana arrests reached unprece-
dented levels. This trend suggests that the growth in
marijuana arrests in the 1990s has had no measurable
impact on price, access, or availability.Harm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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The drug war has been predicated on arresting high-rank-
ing narco-traffickers, as the opening quote by former
Attorney General Ashcroft illustrates. However, the data
indicate that this has not been the practice. During the
1990s the focus of law enforcement has been on low-level
marijuana offenders. In fact, some law enforcement offi-
cials acknowledge that they target low-level offenders as
part of a larger strategy known as "quality of life," or order
maintenance, policing. This approach emphasizes the use
of police officers to stop and frisk pedestrians under the
assumption that such encounters will deter people from
carrying contraband. In practice, this approach often tar-
gets low-level offenses as a means of identifying more sub-
stantial criminal behavior. Former New York City Police
Commissioner Howard Safir remarked, in defense of this
strategy, " [o]ur plan is to attack it on all levels. We're not
just going after the major traffickers; we're gonna harass
the little guys on a daily basis" [13].
This approach has had a disproportionate impact on the
African American community. According to data from the
National Survey on Drug Use and Health for 2002,
approximately 74% of regular marijuana users (those who
have used within the past month) are non-Hispanic
whites and 14% are black, rates that are similar to lifetime
use patterns as well (76% white and 11% black) [14]. But
these figures contrast sharply with arrest rates. While
blacks make up approximately 14% of marijuana users in
the general population, they are 30% of those arrested for
marijuana violations.
Enforcement policy decisions are one potential explana-
tory factor for the disparity in arrest by race. A Maryland
study on marijuana enforcement observed that police
officers knew where to go if they wished to make an easy
drug arrest, and suggested that they could do so whenever
they wished in certain neighborhoods [15]. These neigh-
borhoods are those where drug use and selling is most
likely to be in public spaces, allowing for easy apprehen-
sion. Research by criminologist Alfred Blumstein supports
this point, observing that disproportionate arrest rates are
due to "a more dense police presence where blacks reside"
[16].
The cost to law enforcement
The growth of marijuana arrests results in substantial costs
for law enforcement. Since 1991, the domestic law
enforcement component of the federal drug control
budget has increased from $4.6 billion (or 42% of the fed-
eral drug control budget) to $9.5 billion (or 51% of the
federal drug control budget) in 2002 [17]. This increase of
$4.9 billion (107%) has occurred during a period when
most of the growth in drug arrests has been for marijuana.
Of the total law enforcement budget for 2001 of $72.4 bil-
lion, we estimate that $2.1 billion, or 2.9% of the entire
law enforcement budget nationally, is spent on marijuana
arrests. Of this, approximately $430 million is spent on
marijuana trafficking and $1.7 billion on marijuana pos-
session arrests [18].
Federal Drug Control Budget – 1991 to 2002** Figure 6
Federal Drug Control Budget – 1991 to 2002**. ** = 
Chart adapted from Pastore and Maguire, Table 1.12.
Trends in Marijuana Pricing and Law Enforcement – 1990 to  2000 Figure 5
Trends in Marijuana Pricing and Law Enforcement – 1990 to 
2000.Harm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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Law enforcement resource allocation
In addition to cost, a significant consequence of these tac-
tics includes reduced law enforcement attention to other
criminal behavior. Law enforcement resources come from
a finite pool of funding in the general revenue fund. It is
the responsibility of the legislature to determine how
these resources will be allocated (law enforcement, correc-
tions, education, roads, etc.). If the role of law enforce-
ment is to be expanded, there are three options available
to accomplish this: 1) increase the size of the common
pool (raise taxes); 2) alter the distribution within the com-
mon pool (draw monies away from a different program
and direct additional funding towards law enforcement);
or 3) alter the approach of law enforcement patterns
(practice selective enforcement of offenses).
Economists Rasmussen and Benson believe that the latter
is the most likely solution. " [I]ndividual police officers
and police departments as a whole must decide which
laws to attempt to enforce and how rigorously" [19].
Increased resources directed towards a specific type of
offense, such as drugs, lead inevitably to a decrease in
resources dedicated to another offense. Law enforcement
resource allocation is a zero-sum game, and any difference
in appropriation is likely to manifest itself in delayed
response times. "As drug crimes receive more attention
from police ... the queues for other offenses must move
slower as fewer resources are allocated to them" [20]. This
is of particular concern in light of recent developments
which indicate that many cities and municipalities are los-
ing police officers in response to budgetary constraints
[21].
Benson, Rasmussen and Kim find support for this hypoth-
esis. Looking at data from Florida, they conclude that
every additional drug arrest leads to an increase of 0.7
Index (serious) crimes [22]. The authors surmise that
increased law enforcement of drug offenses has a dual
effect: it directs resources away from the pursuit of Index
crimes, and it may drive potential economically moti-
vated drug offenders into non-drug crimes (some of
which may be more dangerous or costly to society) where
law enforcement attention is not as greatly concentrated.
A quasi-replication of that study using more recent data
from Florida found that a one percent increase in drug
arrests would lead to a .18% increase in Index crime [23].
The impact of the war on drugs on the enforcement of
other crimes has been demonstrated elsewhere. A study of
New York State law enforcement data found that an
increase in drug arrests for sale and possession led to a sig-
nificant increase in assaults, robberies, burglaries, and lar-
cenies [24]. Moreover, a 10% increase in marijuana sale
arrests led to 880 additional larcenies statewide [25].
The shift in the 1990s towards more aggressive policing of
marijuana may have siphoned law enforcement resources
away from certain Index crimes. Rasmussen and Benson
suggest that not only is this a possible scenario, but that
there are institutional incentives in place that encourage
the pursuit of drug crimes. Civil asset forfeiture, which
permits law enforcement agencies to seize all or a portion
of property obtained during a drug investigation, creates
an incentive for administrators to dedicate more resources
to drug enforcement. " [L]aw enforcement agencies focus
resources on enforcement of drug laws because of the
financial gains for the agencies arising from forfeitures"
[26]. Indeed, a recent analysis of arrest patterns in police
departments that are permitted to retain a portion of
seized assets discovered that this policy resulted in an
increase of drug arrests by 18%, and drug arrests as a por-
tion of all arrests by 20% [27].
Marijuana enforcement at the local level
The geographical variation in marijuana arrest patterns at
the local level illustrates the critical role of discretion in
defining a law enforcement agency's policy. Table 1 pro-
vides the number of arrests in 1990 and 2002 in the
nation's ten largest counties as well as ten other large
counties chosen for their geographic distribution, taken
from the Uniform Crime Report [28].
Several key findings can be identified from these figures:
• Every major county except for Fairfax, Virginia experi-
enced an increase in marijuana arrests between 1990 and
2002;
• The growth rates in marijuana arrests in the top 10 coun-
ties ranged from 20% (San Diego, CA) to 418% (King,
WA);
• In 1990, 11 of the 20 counties in our sample had more
than 1,000 marijuana arrests; in 2002, all but one had
more than 1,000 marijuana arrests.
A number of counties had very few arrests in 1990, so the
growth these counties experienced produced astronomi-
cal increases. Eight counties more than doubled their mar-
ijuana arrests between 1990 and 2002, with some
increasing five- and ten-fold. In addition to the near uni-
form patterns of growth, the other noteworthy trend was
the consistent growth in arrests for possession. In nearly
every county in the sample, the growth rate for possession
arrests far exceeded that for sales or manufacturing.
Despite the similarities, there are variations in the degree
of growth, and there are also a number of counties that
experienced a decline in some types of marijuana arrests.
In the ten most populous counties, the growth in arrests
ranged from 20% (San Diego) to 418% (King, WA). ThisHarm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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variation was affected by the size of the county and the
degree to which each had been pursuing marijuana viola-
tions in 1990 versus 2002. It also underscores the impor-
tance of individual policymakers and practitioners
making decisions that shift the emphasis in enforcement
policy. Short of a localized, rapid increase in marijuana
sales and use, for a county to experience the size of growth
witnessed in Clark (Nevada), Shelby (Tennessee), or most
of the counties in this sample, a tangible modification of
marijuana arrest policies is the most likely cause. As a
means of demonstrating this point, we examine the trends
in marijuana arrest patterns in New York City and discuss
the impact of contemporaneous political developments.
Marijuana at the city level
Examining city level arrest patterns is an instructive
approach to provide context to national level trends. In
the case of New York City, the 1990s represented a pro-
found shift in policing strategy that resulted in an expo-
nential growth in marijuana arrests. Although the
experience in New York City may not be representative of
developments across the country, it is an example of the
ways in which the decisions of local officials played a role
in the national increase in marijuana arrests.
Prior to the election of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in 1994,
the New York City Police Department applied a low-key
approach towards marijuana use and distribution. Mari-
juana offenses were usually treated with a fine issued in
the form of a citation, and in many cases individuals were
not required to report to court, but were permitted to han-
dle the ticket in the same fashion as a traffic summons.
The election of Mayor Giuliani, with a promise of address-
ing "quality of life" issues [29] in New York City, and the
subsequent appointment of William Bratton as police
commissioner, ushered in a new era of policing in the city.
Shifting away from the "community policing" model of
the previous Dinkins administration, Commissioner Brat-
ton implemented a strategy of "zero tolerance" policing.
Grounded in the philosophy of "broken windows," zero
tolerance policing is characterized by aggressive policing
of traditionally ignored, minor offenses. If left unchecked,
according to supporters of this approach, this allows an
element of criminality to take root in a community, lead-
ing to more serious criminal behavior. New York police
officers increased their use of stop-and-frisk searches in an
effort to crack down on public nuisance offenses. In 1997,
a New York Police Department unit of 433 officers per-
formed stop-and-frisk searches on about 45,000 people
[30]. In the process of targeting public-nuisance issues,
the Department also began a revitalized pursuit of mari-
juana offenders.
The new policing strategy was crafted to target violations
of public order, and to increase the overall risk of appre-
hension for all offenses. By casting as wide a net as possi-
ble, the police sought to increase the likelihood of
Table 1: Marijuana Arrests-Large U.S. Counties – 1990 and 2002****
County 1990 Sale 2002 Sale % Growth 1990 Poss. 2002 Poss. % Growth 1990 Total 2002 Total % Growth
Los Angeles (CA) 6,708 2,868 -57 5,638 12,929 129 12,346 15,797 28
Cook (IL)* 8,974 N/A N/A 1,597 N/A N/A 10,571 N/A N/A
Harris (TX) 68 38 -44 1,593 7,174 349 1,661 7,212 334
Maricopa (AZ) 563 462 -18 3,529 6,194 76 4, s092 6,656 63
Orange (CA) 636 579 -9 3,128 6,466 107 3,764 7,045 87
San Diego (CA) 1,588 756 -52 3,162 4,950 57 4,750 5,706 20
Miami-Dade (FL)* 1,279 N/A N/A 3,926 N/A N/A 5,205 N/A N/A
Dallas (TX) 174 260 49 2,483 2,992 20 2,657 3,252 22
Wayne (MI) 182 223 23 1,009 2,357 134 1,191 2,580 117
King (WA) 94 187 99 639 3,608 465 733 3,795 418
Philadelphia (PA) 468 2,449 423 358 3,774 954 826 6,223 653
Middlesex (MA) 93 233 151 676 1,274 88 769 1,507 96
Cuyahoga (OH) 161 141 -12 732 1,032 41 893 1,173 31
Clark (NV) 9 560 6,122 98 3,472 3,443 107 4,032 3,668
Hennepin (MN) 25 467 1768 739 1,184 60 764 1,651 116
St. Louis (MO) 106 126 19 617 1,625 163 723 1,751 142
Fairfax (VA) 53 18 -66 383 258 -33 436 276 -37
Milwaukee (WI) 363 840 131 1,542 2,228 44 1,905 3,068 61
Shelby (TN) 34 584 1,618 91 1,790 1,867 125 2,374 1,799
Fulton (GA) 314 776 147 2,750 3,757 37 3,064 4,533 48
**** – Cook County, Illinois and Miami-Dade County, Florida did not provide marijuana arrest statistics to the Uniform Crime Report in 2002.Harm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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apprehending more substantial criminal offenders. Sup-
porters of this approach contend that increasing the prob-
ability of arrest provides a deterrent effect to persons
carrying weapons or illegal drugs on the street.
The way in which law enforcement implements this pol-
icy is through increased use of the "stop-and-frisk" tech-
nique. "A 'stop' intervention provides an occasion for the
police to have contact with persons presumably involved
in low-level criminality" without meeting the evidentiary
burden necessary to make an arrest, while providing a pre-
tense for further investigation [31]. One New York Police
official described the approach: " [y]our open beer lets me
check your ID. Now I can radio the precinct for outstand-
ing warrants or parole violations. Maybe I bump against
that bulge in your belt; with probable cause, I can frisk
you" [32]. A legal "stop" may result in nothing more than
a verification that an individual was engaged in legal
behavior. But it also may result in an arrest for a low-level
offense, or, and this is the reason cited by supporters, it
may result in the identification of more serious criminal
behavior.
Such an approach is more intrusive than conventional
policing and increases the likelihood that persons will
face arrest for low-level violations, such as marijuana use,
that may have been ignored in the past. Moreover, oppo-
nents contend that this aggressive approach results in
racially discriminatory arrest patterns and is tantamount
to police harassment. The growth in the use of the "stop-
and-frisk" technique in New York City in the 1990s
unquestionably was partly responsible for the increase in
the number of low-level marijuana arrests during that
period. The discretion that police officers have in initiat-
ing a stop is evidenced by the fact that less than one-third
of all encounters are the result of a person meeting the
description of a suspect for a crime [33]. An analysis of
more than 175,000 "stop-and-frisk" encounters during a
15-month period in 1998 and 1999 indicated that African
Americans and Hispanics were substantially more likely
to be stopped by the police, and this difference could not
be explained by legal factors such as criminality or overall
crime rates [34].
As Figure 7 illustrates, the increased use of "stop-and-
frisk" encounters produced a dramatic rise in marijuana
arrests, most of which focused on use rather than traffick-
ing. In 1990, there were 5,116 arrests for marijuana
offenses, of which 34.5% (1,766) were for possession. By
2002, marijuana arrests had increased by 882%, totaling
more than 50,000. Of those, 90% (45,227) were for pos-
session offenses, representing an increase of more than
2400%. In contrast, total arrests for all offenses were up
only 8%. Arrests for violent crimes dropped 33% and fel-
ony drug crimes dropped 39%. Not surprisingly, misde-
meanor drug arrests increased by 143%, driven by growth
in marijuana arrests. If the growth in marijuana posses-
sion arrests is removed from the equation, overall drug
arrests in New York City would have dropped by nearly
15,000. This trend should come as little surprise, as some
experts suggest a byproduct of order maintenance policing
will be an increase in arrests for low-level offenses [35].
Nationally, the proportion of marijuana arrests from New
York City also grew exponentially. In 1990, 1.6% of all
marijuana arrests nationally occurred in New York City;
that figure more than quadrupled to 7.2% by 2002. The
proportion of possession arrests from New York City grew
ten-fold, from 0.7% to 7.4% of national arrests. This
translates into more than 12% of the growth in national
marijuana arrests between 1990 and 2002. While New
York City represents approximately 3% of the nation's
population and 2.1% of the nation's total arrests, more
than 7% of all marijuana arrests in the entire country in
2002 occurred in New York City. These figures indicate a
citywide policy that, in the process of executing a zero-tol-
erance policing model, has demonstrably shifted towards
the targeting of marijuana users for arrest.
Alternative enforcement strategies: domestic and 
international
Although not all large American cities were experiencing
as significant an upward turn in marijuana arrests as in
New York City, the country was moving in that direction
on a national scale. Domestically the rapid growth in mar-
ijuana arrests has led to a number of situations in which
local officials have succumbed to the overwhelming
increase in workload and have responded by demanding
a change in practice. In 2000, local district attorneys in
Marijuana Arrests in New York City – 1990 to 2002*** Figure 7
Marijuana Arrests in New York City – 1990 to 
2002***. *** = Data from the New York State Division of 
Criminal Justice Services, Computerized Criminal History 
System.Harm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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Texas declined to accept low-level drug prosecutions from
federal agencies because they could not keep up with the
number of arrests [36]. One district attorney noted, "We
wanted to do our share of fighting the war on drugs. But
now it's too much" [37].
In Syracuse, the proportion of resources dedicated to drug
enforcement raised concern with the city's auditor. The
auditor's report to the mayor noted that drug-related
arrests "exceeded arrests for assaults, disturbances, and
larcenies combined," and that arrests for marijuana com-
prised nearly one-third of all drug arrests [38]. City Audi-
tor Minchin G. Lewis expressed concern that the
department's emphasis on pursuing drug use had unin-
tended consequences for the community and was an inef-
ficient use of law enforcement resources. Lewis
recommended that the Common Council of Syracuse
conduct a survey of neighborhood residents and identify
the level to which residents are concerned with drug
related incidents. "Devoting so many taxpayer resources
in an effort to eliminate the distribution of drugs could be
a significant misappropriation of resources if the primary
concern is not drug use" [39].
In Chicago, similar concerns have been raised, this time in
a report submitted by a city police sergeant [40]. Sergeant
Thomas Donegan noted that the vast majority (over 90%)
of marijuana arrests in Chicago were dismissed or
dropped, leading him to question why law enforcement
agents were dedicating significant resources to pursue
marijuana when approximately nine of ten cases will not
result in a conviction. Donegan recommended the use of
fines rather than arrest for marijuana use, a proposal
endorsed by Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley.
These concerns of practitioners are translating into reform
measures at the ballot box. In the late 1990s, Arizona
passed Proposition 200, which among other reforms,
explicitly noted that drug use was to be treated as a health
problem, with monies dedicated to treatment and educa-
tion rather than incarceration. More recently, Proposition
36 in California created a protocol to divert low-level drug
offenders into treatment rather than prison. In Seattle, the
passage of Initiative 75 reduced marijuana for adult per-
sonal use to the lowest law enforcement priority, esti-
mated to be saving tens of thousands of dollars in state
prison and local jail costs. In addition to the numerous
state initiatives in the past few years permitting the use of
marijuana for medical purposes, there have also been
efforts to reform the response to recreational use.
In the 2004 election, a number of state and local initia-
tives addressed the need for change in the manner in
which law enforcement treats marijuana use [41]. In Oak-
land, California, Measure Z, which was passed with 64%
of the vote, will "make investigation, arrest, prosecution,
and imprisonment for private adult cannabis offenses the
lowest law enforcement priority ..." In Columbia, Mis-
souri, 61% of voters supported reforms to the current
criminal code that will reduce the punishment for posses-
sion to a $250 fine and keep marijuana cases in municipal
court. This legislation resembles approaches employed in
Ann Arbor, Michigan and Madison, Wisconsin.
In addition to these domestic changes, there have also
been similar developments abroad. In May of 2004, Rus-
sia decriminalized the possession of small amounts of
narcotics, including marijuana. Canada continues to
debate decriminalization of marijuana, but in June of
2003, Toronto Police Chief Julian Fantino declared that
he had instructed his officers to discontinue making
Table 3: Average Felony Sentence (months) in State Court – 2000
All Offenses Aggravated Assault Marijuana Marijuana 
Possession
Marijuana 
Trafficking
Prison/Jail 36 (16)* 37 (16) 28 (12) 31 (16) 27 (9)
Probation 38 (36) 40 (36) 40 (36) 42 (36) 39 (36)
*Median in parentheses
Table 2: Felony State Sentences for Marijuana Convictions – 1990 and 2000
PRISON JAIL PROBATION
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Possession 3 0 %3 2 %2 2 %1 9 %4 8 %4 9 %
Trafficking 3 1 %3 3 %4 2 %3 0 %2 7 %3 7 %Harm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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arrests for simple possession of marijuana [42]. In
response to the developments in Toronto, the head of the
provincial association of police chiefs suggested to all law
enforcement in Ontario to "use discretion in situations
that involve the simple possession of marijuana" [43].
England has also been experimenting with decriminaliza-
tion. In August of 2001, the police commissioner in Brix-
ton announced that the police would no longer be
making arrests for personal possession of marijuana, as a
result of the police and courts being overrun with mari-
juana related arrests. In Brixton, about 90% of all drug
arrests are for possession and about 75% of those posses-
sion arrests are for marijuana [44]. By the summer of
2002, it was announced that all of Britain would be
decriminalizing personal amounts of marijuana [45].
Former Home Secretary David Blunkett stressed that the
decriminalization of marijuana did not equate to decrim-
inalization of all behaviors related to the use of mari-
juana. "Where cannabis possession is linked to aggravated
behavior that threatens public order, the police will retain
the power of arrest," while noting that this policy will per-
mit Britain to "concentrate [our] efforts on the drugs that
cause the most harm ..." [46].
The common thread in these developments has been a
response by officials to the significant amount of time and
resources that law enforcement officials dedicate to the
pursuit of marijuana offenses. Dissatisfaction with the
pursuit of the war on drugs has led a number of the
nation's leading policing administrators to call for reform.
A 2004 survey of 300 chiefs of police indicated that two-
thirds of respondents believed that the response by law
enforcement to drug use and sale had been unsuccessful
[47]. Three-quarters of police chiefs believe that the
resource gap for the enforcement of drug laws is more sig-
nificant than with any other criminal or public safety
requirements [48]. For these reasons, 84% of chiefs of
police felt that there need to be changes implemented in
the way drug laws are enforced [49].
Assessing the increase in marijuana arrests
During the period after the beginning of the modern
"drug war," a measurable shift in drug enforcement strat-
egy could be identified. As seen previously in Figure 4, at
the beginning of the 1980s, nearly three-quarters of all
drug arrests were for marijuana; by the end of the decade
that percentage had dropped to one-third. But by the early
1990s, drug enforcement relative to other arrests began to
diminish. Rasmussen and Benson observe that between
1989 and 1990, the ratio of drug arrests to Index I crime
arrests dropped by 24% [50]. This led the authors to con-
clude that the "drug war" was winding down relative to
general law enforcement trends, or at least shifting the
way that it was being pursued.
With the benefit of hindsight, fourteen years later it is
clear that the drug war did not wind down. However, a
closer examination of the growth in drug arrests indicates
that there was a kernel of truth to the Rasmussen and Ben-
son prediction about the abatement of drug enforcement.
The 1990s ushered in a fundamental change in the way
the drug war was pursued. As the crack cocaine market
began to constrict in urban areas and the use of cocaine,
heroin, and other substances remained flat, the category
of primary drug abuse violation arrests skewed signifi-
cantly towards marijuana, and particularly possession. Of
the nearly one-half million increase in drug abuse viola-
tions between 1990 and 2002, 79% was for marijuana
possession.
The precipitous growth of marijuana possession arrests is
striking in the context of declining overall crime rates and
stability in other drug abuse violations, as well as general
use patterns nationally. Moreover, the growth in mari-
juana possession arrests beginning in the early 1990s was
incongruous with the initial justification of the war on
drugs in the 1980s, which stressed cocaine and heroin as
targeted substances.
Marijuana arrests may have increased during the 1990s as
a function of structural changes in criminal behavior and
law enforcement strategies that increased the likelihood of
marijuana arrests within the pre-existing routines of law
enforcement officers. By the early 1990s, drug abuse
arrests were leveling off and overall crime rates were
decreasing as well. Beginning in 1992, violent and prop-
erty crime would begin a sustained reduction for the long-
est duration in 30 years. During that same period,
President Clinton was spearheading a movement to place
100,000 more police officers on the streets as a means of
combating crime. The decade of the 1990s was character-
ized by these two trends: rapidly decreasing violent and
property crime (beginning prior to the implementation of
the national growth in police officers) and a rapid increase
in law enforcement manpower.
These two trends may have combined to increase the
probability of arrest for marijuana offenses. Law enforce-
ment agencies prioritize their labor allocation; if serious
crime is an entrenched problem in a given area, minor
violations are likely to receive less attention. However, as
the degree of serious crime diminishes, law enforcement
agents are likely to turn their attention to nuisance crimes
Table 4: Criminal History of Marijuana Offenders
First-Timers Recidivist/Non-Violent Recidivist/Violent
40% 48% 12%Harm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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such as prostitution and petty drug crimes. The growth in
stop-and-frisk searches in New York City is an example of
this shift in practice. Therefore, as violent and property
crime dropped through the 1990s, the growing ranks of
law enforcement officers were more likely to pay attention
to minor crimes such as marijuana possession, which
would drive up arrest rates [51].
There has been little study of the method in which law
enforcement agents respond to marijuana possession, but
a Maryland study is instructive regarding the manner in
which many marijuana arrests occur [52]. The authors of
this study found that the rise in marijuana arrests during
the 1990s in Maryland was not the result of a conscious
policy shift, as in New York City; rather, it was the result
of traffic stops and patrols in neighborhoods that the
officers knew were "drug hot spots" [53]. The authors con-
cluded that " [m]any of these arrests are not targeted at
marijuana possession itself but are incidental to traffic
stops, drug enforcement more generally, disorderly con-
duct and other patrol activities" [54]. They pointed out
that general use patterns of marijuana in different Mary-
land counties was not a predictor of marijuana arrests.
The results from Maryland suggest that the growth in mar-
ijuana arrests was not the result of an upper-level direc-
tive; rather, it may simply be the product of an aggregation
of law enforcement officers making more arrests while in
the process of their daily patrol routine.
In the case of New York City, it is apparent that the growth
in marijuana arrests was the result of the use of zero toler-
ance policing, and particularly, an increase in "stop-and-
frisk" encounters. This approach primarily resulted in pos-
session arrests and, as we will demonstrate in the next sec-
tion, most of these were dismissed. Given the substantial
law enforcement investment in such cases, the question is
whether using stops for low-level offenses as a pretense for
detecting more serious criminality is an effective approach
to public safety. It clearly is not the most efficient, as evi-
denced in an Attorney General report concluding that
only one out of every nine stops resulted in an arrest for
any type of crime [55]. While there is no definitive analy-
sis of the New York crime decline to date, most observers
believe that the interplay of a number of variables was
responsible. These include solid economic development,
a dwindling crack cocaine market, demographic changes,
and sophisticated computer technology that increased
police response times [56].
Marijuana and the court system
Given the dramatic growth in marijuana arrests, it is
instructive to examine how these cases have been handled
by the court system. The primary source for national level
sentencing data is the National Judicial Reporting Program,
which issues a biennial survey of felony sentences in state
courts [57]. We collected NJRP data from 1990 and 2000,
analyzing the processing of marijuana offenders in the
state court system [58]. Perhaps surprisingly considering
the growth in the arrest rate, state court systems did not
experience any rapid increase in marijuana offenders
being sentenced for a felony offense. The proportion of all
persons sentenced for a marijuana felony in state courts in
2000 was 3.6%, which is 39% higher than the proportion
in 1990 (2.6%), but far below the 113% growth in arrests
during this period. The key findings of the court analysis
are the following:
• System dismisses large number of arrestees, likely misdemeanors
The state sentencing figures in 2000 indicate a similar pat-
tern as in 1990, suggesting that pre-trial dismissals and the
fact that most arrests were for low-level misdemeanors
dramatically mediated the shift in law enforcement treat-
ment of marijuana over the decade. For example, in 2000
there were 734,000 marijuana arrests and approximately
41,000 felony convictions in state and federal courts [59].
Thus, only 1 of every 18 arrests results in some type of fel-
ony sentence.
Considering the significant growth in arrests during this
period and the relative stasis in felony sentences for mari-
juana in the state court system, it is apparent that the vast
majority of the more than 700,000 arrests for marijuana
in 2000 are for misdemeanors, or are dismissed for one or
more of a variety of reasons.
Growth in Arrests in New York City – 1990 to 2002 Figure 8
Growth in Arrests in New York City – 1990 to 2002.Harm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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• Of those convicted of a felony, one-half to two-thirds sentenced to 
incarceration
In 2000, persons convicted of felony marijuana offenses
were likely to be incarcerated. Half (51%) of the convic-
tions for possession led to a prison or jail term, as did two-
thirds (63%) of the trafficking convictions. Overall, one-
third of all felony marijuana convictions resulted in a
prison term of at least one year. This rate was the same for
both marijuana trafficking and possession, raising ques-
tions regarding the charging phase of the proceedings that
will be discussed later. As seen in Table 2, the distribution
of persons sentenced to prison for trafficking and posses-
sion is similar, with the only dramatic departure in the use
of probation and fines for persons sentenced for a mari-
juana trafficking felony.
Conventional wisdom suggests that individuals sentenced
to prison for possession are repeat offenders with signifi-
cant criminal histories. Although this may be true of many
sentences, some states mandate incarceration even for
some types of first-time marijuana possession. In Ala-
bama, a 2004 report by the state's sentencing commission
found that 328 people were sentenced to prison for mari-
juana possession, and only one-third were repeat offend-
ers [60].
The rates for jail and probation sentences were relatively
stable across time, although the proportion of persons
sentenced to jail for marijuana trafficking dropped by
nearly one-third while the proportion sentenced to proba-
tion increased by 37%.
• Average sentence length upwards of two years
Recent data on sentence length indicates that persons sen-
tenced for a marijuana felony are likely to face sentences
in the range of the national average for aggravated assault.
In 2000, the average sentence for a person convicted of
aggravated assault in a state court and sentenced to incar-
ceration (prison or jail) was 37 months (median = 16
months), while the average sentence for persons sen-
tenced to probation for a felony was 40 months (median
= 36 months) [61]. An analysis of those figures for persons
sentenced for marijuana felonies indicate a similar sen-
tencing range. The average sentence for persons convicted
of a marijuana felony in state court in 2000 was 28
months (median = 12 months) for incarceration and 40
months (median = 36 months) for probation [62].
Separated by type of marijuana offense, we find that pos-
session cases actually result in more severe sentences than
trafficking. Persons sentenced for trafficking received an
average of 27 months (median = 9 months) incarceration,
while those sentenced to probation received 39 months
(median = 36 months). For possession, the incarceration
Marijuana Offense Dispositions by Type – New York City,  2002 Figure 10
Marijuana Offense Dispositions by Type – New York City, 
2002.
Marijuana Offense Dispositions by Type – New York City,  1994 Figure 9
Marijuana Offense Dispositions by Type – New York City, 
1994.Harm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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average was 31 months (median = 16 months) and the
probation average was 42 months (median = 36 months).
A potential explanation for marijuana possession cases
receiving longer sentences, in general, than convictions
for sale is due to the inclusion of "possession with intent
to distribute" cases [63]. Whereas trafficking convictions
require face-to-face purchases (frequently multiple pur-
chases) by law enforcement in order to build a case of a
criminal drug enterprise, possession with intent to distrib-
ute cases are based solely on the quantity of drugs found
at the time of arrest. For example, if law enforcement
agents exercise a warrant and enter a home to find a signif-
icant quantity of marijuana (more than deemed reflective
of personal use) coupled with paraphernalia indicative of
marijuana distribution, this evidence will likely be suffi-
cient to merit a prosecutor pursuing a charge of possession
with intent to distribute. Since the agents do not have evi-
dence of a continuing criminal enterprise, a prosecutor is
unlikely to seek a trafficking charge, which is more bur-
densome to prove. Because most trafficking cases are com-
prised of multiple purchases, any single charge for
possession with intent to distribute will potentially elicit
higher quantities of marijuana as well as the associated
distribution paraphernalia than a typical series of face-to-
face purchases by a law enforcement agent building a traf-
ficking case.
The relatively stable patterns in state court conviction
data, in light of the growth in arrests, raises questions
about the allocation of law enforcement resources during
the 1990s. While the numbers of arrests have more than
doubled, making marijuana the single most pursued
offense by American law enforcement agents, overall fel-
ony convictions have increased only modestly during the
decade. Further, there is no discernable increase in the
severity of marijuana offenses, since similar proportions
are being sentenced to prison as in the past. Therefore, it
appears that the court system is expending resources
processing, dismissing, and filtering the increasing wave
of marijuana arrestees. We estimate that 3.6% ($1.36 bil-
lion) of the national judicial and legal budget for 2001
($37.8 billion) was spent on the court processing of mar-
ijuana offenders [64]. The fact that the upward trend in
arrests is not reflected in felony conviction data suggests
that the quality of arrests has diminished greatly. It is rea-
sonable to surmise that the growth in marijuana arrests,
which are primarily for possession, is laden with misde-
meanor charges and cases that are dismissed by the pros-
ecuting authority. From a policy standpoint, the question
is whether this is an efficient use of law enforcement and
court system resources.
Marijuana in a city court system: a case study
There have been serious policy implications for criminal
justice resources as a result of this shift in resources
towards marijuana arrests. In New York City the increase
in arrests due to the Giuliani-Bratton model of zero toler-
ance policing inundated the court system with marijuana
cases. The number of arrests for marijuana increased
882% between 1990 and 2002, with an increase of 739%
since Giuliani was elected in 1994, including a 1,877%
increase in possession arrests [65]. This contributed to a
backup of the court system to such a degree that by 1999
the number of overall cases dismissed because the dead-
line for a "speedy trial" had passed was up 20% from 1993
[66].
The disproportionate impact of possession arrests trans-
lates into court dispositions as well, as seen in Figures 9
and 10. In 1994, three of every five (61%) dispositions for
marijuana in New York City courts were for sales offenses.
By 2002, that figure had dropped to one of nine (11%).
Overall, possession dispositions increased 1576% while
conviction rates for sales dropped by one-third. All of the
growth in marijuana possession dispositions was in the
area of misdemeanor offenses. While lower court (misde-
meanor) dispositions increased more than 17-fold, upper
court (felony) dispositions for possession dropped 31%.
Meanwhile, the pattern in dispositions for sales offenses
remained relatively flat. Lower court dispositions grew by
5% while the number of upper court dispositions was too
low to arrive at any accurate statistical conclusions. The
impact of zero tolerance policing on the judicial system is
immediately evident upon examining New York City
court data: a more than six-fold increase in marijuana dis-
positions, with a 15-fold increase in possession disposi-
Table 5: Marijuana Offenders in State and Federal Prison
Total Marijuana Offenders in Prison 27,900 (100%)
Total First-Time Marijuana Offenders in Prison 11,200 (40%)
No weapon 10,400 (37%)
No weapon, No importation 8,500 (30%)
No weapon, No importation, No manufacturing 8,700 (30%)
No weapon, No importation, No manufacturing, No laundering 8,300 (30%)
No weapon, No importation, No manufacturing, No laundering, No distribution 6,600 (24%)Harm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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tions. The majority of this growth was from cases which
the prosecution decided not to proceed with charging,
indicated by a 23-fold increase in marijuana cases dis-
missed in lower court.
Although these cases did not require the level of resources
accorded a full trial, there was a need to allocate court
resources to address even those cases that were dismissed.
Court staff time, processing costs, judge and attorney
hours and other resources need to be dedicated even in
cases that result in dismissal. This includes resources ded-
icated to arrest and processing by the police department
followed by arraignment in the court system. By the time
a case is dismissed, in addition to the arresting officer(s)
and administrative staff necessary to process the defend-
ant, the prosecutor's office and the office of the judge will
also be involved. This comes at significant financial cost to
the city as well as placing an additional burden upon an
already stressed court system.
Marijuana and the correctional system
The endpoint in the criminal justice system is corrections,
where persons sentenced to supervision are either incar-
cerated in prison or jail, or in the community on proba-
tion or parole. Based on current prison population
counts, we estimate that there are 27,900 persons in state
and federal prison serving a sentence for which a mari-
juana violation is the controlling (or most serious)
offense [67]. This translates to a national estimated loss of
more than $600 million per year [68]. Twenty-three per-
cent of marijuana offenders are incarcerated for a posses-
sion offense, 15% for possession with intent to distribute,
and 59% for trafficking. Of the total, 40% are incarcerated
for the first time, 48% are recidivists with no current or
prior violent offense history, and 12% are recidivists with
a past violent offense in their criminal history.
This initial analysis raises questions about the severity of
offenders incarcerated in state and federal prisons for mar-
ijuana offenses. Nearly 90% have no history of a violent
offense. However, violent offenses are not the only meas-
ure of a person's risk to society. Many officials assert that
prison sentences for marijuana are imposed for high level
offenses. In order to address this question, we analyzed
the data from the Survey of Inmates on offender role in a
drug enterprise.
The Inmate Survey asks respondents to report their activity
in the drug trade. Although self-report data suffers from
some inherent biases, it is a much better indicator of indi-
vidual level drug involvement because, unlike the control-
ling offense, it is not impacted by pre-trial discretion and
negotiations regarding charging level (as discussed in the
section on court processes). We define drug activity as
high-level if the individual has been involved in "import-
ing," "manufacturing," "money laundering" or "distribu-
tion to other sellers." We estimate that 48% of marijuana
offenders in state and federal prison were engaged in high-
level drug activity prior to their arrest. Federal marijuana
offenders participated in high-level activity at a higher rate
(65%) than state prisoners (40%).
Using reported activity response as an indicator, there is
reason to question the assertion that only serious mari-
juana distributors are incarcerated in prison. In fact, the
data strongly indicate that a significant number of mari-
juana offenders are in prison for playing a low-level role
in the drug market. We can see this by identifying only
those persons in state or federal prison on a first-time
offense, who had not played a role of importer, manufac-
turer, or distributor of marijuana, and who did not
involve a weapon in their offense [69]. Table 5 illustrates
that when these characteristics are taken into considera-
tion, there are still 6,600 (24%) marijuana offenders in
prison for a low-level offense. Based upon these criteria,
we conclude that at least one in four persons in prison for
a marijuana offense can be classified as a low-level
offender.
In addition to persons serving a sentence in state or fed-
eral prison for a marijuana offense, there are a greater
number of people on probation or parole or in jail.
Although data for these populations is not available at the
same level of detail as for persons in prison, we were able
to create estimates of the number of people on probation
or sentenced to jail for a marijuana offense using data
from the National Judicial Reporting Program. Based on sen-
tencing patterns in 2000, we estimate in 2003 that 36,000
people were on probation for a marijuana offense and an
additional 4,600 were in jail serving a sentence for mari-
juana. These jail numbers do not include pre-trial detain-
ees awaiting court proceedings. Thus, with half of the
nearly 700,000 persons in jail awaiting trial, we estimate
that the number of those persons who have been charged
with a marijuana offense will equal or exceed the 4,600
people that have been sentenced.
Based on the available data for prison, jail, and probation,
we estimate that over 68,000 people are under correc-
tional supervision for a marijuana offense. While there are
no data regarding the proportion of persons on parole for
a marijuana offense, it is likely that this group would raise
the total number of persons under supervision to more
than 75,000. In addition, there are an unknown number
of persons in prison due to a probation or parole violation
for a non-marijuana offense who have had their supervi-
sion revoked after testing positive for marijuana.Harm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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Discussion and recommendations
It is apparent that despite a rapidly evolving national dia-
logue around marijuana use and a renewed discussion of
alternatives to arrest and incarceration, during the 1990s
the law enforcement community pursued marijuana
offenses with a renewed vigor. Arrests for possession came
to dominate nearly all of the growth in drug arrests during
the period studied. Assertions that "nobody" goes to
prison for marijuana are misguided and over-simplify the
policy issue. Modest numbers of persons serving time in
prison for a marijuana offense does not necessarily mean
that the country is effectively calibrating its resources to
address marijuana use.
Narrowly focusing on people incarcerated in state and
federal prison for marijuana offenses diverts the lens of
analysis from the real target: low-level marijuana users.
These persons have disproportionately been targeted by
the war on drugs in the 1990s. Increased arrests and fre-
quent use of probation and suspended sentences may give
the appearance that the correctional system has been cali-
brated properly to only incarcerate the most severe
offenders, but a discussion of resource allocation
demands that we also consider the growth of persons with
an arrest and felony conviction record as a result of this
policy. Such persons face many of the same challenges
and obstacles as people who have been incarcerated.
These include a denial of federal financial aid for higher
education, lack of access to federal aid such as food
stamps, denial of entry to public housing, and a prohibi-
tion on the right to vote, in some states for life. In addition
to the institutional hurdles, there remain informal barri-
ers for persons with a felony conviction, such as the diffi-
culty to compete for employment with a criminal record.
All of these critical issues are a cost of the drug war and
exist equally whether one spends time in prison or serves
a sentence in the community.
Moreover, there are important policy questions regarding
the growth of marijuana arrests and the impact on law
enforcement and court processing resources. As states
continue to struggle under budgetary constraints, the wis-
dom of making nearly 700,000 marijuana arrests annu-
ally, the majority of which will be dismissed or processed
as misdemeanors, is called into question. Proponents of
public order, or "broken windows" policing, maintain
that these arrests are symbolic and serve to maintain
order, which leads to the suppression of more dangerous
crime. However, this is a contentious point, and more
than twenty years after the philosophy was put forth by
James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, there remains no
empirical validation of its truth. Criminologist Ralph Tay-
lor notes that "initial incivilities contribute to later
changes in some serious crimes ... [b]ut the contributions
are neither as sizable as anticipated, nor as consistent ...
[70].
What is empirically evident is that the growth in mari-
juana arrests over the 1990s has not led to a decrease in
use or availability, nor an increase in cost. Meanwhile, bil-
lions are being spent nationally on the apprehension and
processing of marijuana arrestees with no demonstrable
impact on the use of marijuana itself, or any general
reduction in other criminal behavior. Our analysis of
criminal justice processing of marijuana use over the
1990s suggests that the contemporary approach is appor-
tioning resources inefficiently at each stage of the system.
In order to address issues of marijuana and the criminal
justice system in a more effective manner, policymakers
and practitioners should consider the following recom-
mendations.
Law enforcement
Prioritize arrest policies
As has become policy in jurisdictions such as Seattle and
Oakland, law enforcement agencies should categorize
enforcement of marijuana possession as a low priority so
as to conserve police resources for more serious offenses.
Eliminate marijuana enforcement as a means of "broken windows" 
policing
Marijuana arrests in some cities have been justified on the
premise that arresting people for marijuana possession
disrupts other, potentially more serious, behaviors. Such
strategies result in substantially increased numbers of low-
level marijuana arrests, with little evidence that they are
actually effective in suppressing other criminal behaviors.
Further, they contribute to the mistrust of law enforce-
ment, particularly in communities of color that have been
disproportionately targeted by such practices.
Courts
Exercise prosecutorial discretion to divert cases from the court 
system
Few marijuana possession arrests result in any significant
jail or prison time, yet they are cumulatively quite costly
to the court system through the engagement of prosecu-
tors, defense counsel, judges, and probation officers. Pros-
ecutors should use their discretion in appropriate cases to
drop charges and/or utilize community resources at the
earliest possible stage of court proceedings in order to
effect outcomes that represent a reasonable allocation of
resources.
Exercise prosecutorial discretion to reduce the number of felony 
convictions
In most states felony drug convictions carry a set of collat-
eral consequences in addition to whatever punishment is
directly imposed. These may include a ban on receipt ofHarm Reduction Journal 2006, 3:6 http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/6
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welfare benefits, prohibition on living in public housing,
loss of student loans, and loss of the right to vote. These
punishments place additional burdens on ex-offenders
attempting to reenter the community. Therefore, to the
extent that the interests of justice can be served through a
misdemeanor conviction rather than a felony, prosecutors
should use their charging discretion to pursue such out-
comes.
Policy
Encourage debate on marijuana policy
National debate on drug issues has too often been charac-
terized by "soundbites" that distort the policy issues
under consideration. In the case of marijuana, proposals
for decriminalization represent an alternative approach to
current policy. Consideration of such options should be
addressed in the context of the findings of this report,
including the substantial criminal justice and social costs
involved in the large-scale prosecution of marijuana
offenders. National debate on marijuana policy, and drug
policy generally, should be focused on the most effective
ways of addressing substance abuse and the most efficient
allocation of law enforcement resources.
Federal government should respect local decisions
For the period of the war on drugs, federal funding – cur-
rently $19 billion a year – has been allocated in a 2:1 ratio
of enforcement to treatment/prevention [71]. These prior-
ities have resulted in a bloated prison population, with
high proportions of low-level offenders. The Federal gov-
ernment should defer to local governments to develop
their own approaches to marijuana use and respect the
choices of state, county, and city policymakers. Federal
funding should not be tied to a locality's decision to
address marijuana use in only one fashion, namely law
enforcement; rather, it should also encourage and ade-
quately fund alternative strategies. A number of cities have
raised concerns about the emphatic prosecution of mari-
juana as putting undue stress upon law enforcement
resources, culminating in calls for and implementations
of policy changes. The federal government should recog-
nize these developments, and respect the choices of com-
munities and local government agencies.
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